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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
INTERMOUNTAIN HOLDING COMPANY,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.

Case No, 870156-CA

ADVANCE BUSINESS EQUIPMENT,
Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Due to its dissatisfaction with the statement of issues
presented on appeal in the Brief of Appellant, the respondent
Intermountain Holding Company ("Intermountain") restates the
issues presented on appeal:
1.
trial

Under Utah Rule Civil Procedure 60(b)(1), does the

court

have

the

authority

to

set

aside

a

judgment

entered over five years prior to the time the motion seeking
to set the judgment aside is filed?
2.

Even if the motion was filed in a timely manner, is

it a clear abuse of the trial court's considerable discretion
to deny the motion when the party against whom the judgment
is entered

fails to have a hearing on the motion

excess of five years?

1

for in

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A Judgment by Default was entered in this case on August
12, 1980. 1

On January 10, 1986, appellant Advance Business

Equipment ("ABE") filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment.2

ABE

also filed a second Motion to Set Aside Judgment and Hearing
Thereon dated May 25, 1986,3 together with the Affidavit of
Attorney John T. Caine. 4
Intermountain

filed

the Affidavit

of Randall

S. Feil

dated August 29, 1986, 5 setting forth facts relating to the
entry of the Judgment by Default.

After several hearings

were scheduled, at a hearing held on December 19, 1986, the
District Court denied the Motions to Set Aside.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On February 3, 1975, Intermountain and ABE entered into
a three-year Lease Agreement for one-half of a

6,000-square

foot building located at approximately 2281 South West Temple
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. 6
1

R. 23-24.

2

R. 36-37.

3

The Lease Agreement expired

R. 38-39.

4

Affidavit of
("Caine Affidavit").
5

R. 47-54.

6

Compliant H

Attorney

John

T.

Caine

(R.

3, 4 & Exhibit A (R. 2-3 & 6-9).
2

40-42)

on January

31, 1978. 7

After the expiration of the Lease

Agreement, ABE continued to occupy the premises on a monthto-month basis. 8
a

Fifteen-Day

On October 13, 1978, Intermountain served

Notice

to

Quit upon ABE, terminating

ABE's

month-to-month tenancy.9
On November 2, 1978, Intermountain filed a Complaint in
the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah,
against ABE. 1 0

This Complaint was served upon ABE on January

18, 1979. 11
Before ABE filed an answer, however, the parties entered
into a Stipulation for Settlement dated February 10, 1979. 12
Paragraph 1 of the Stipulation for Settlement required ABE to
pay Intermountain the sum of $2,899.42 on or before February
17, 1979. 13

Paragraph 2 of the Stipulation for Settlement

required ABE to remove itself from the rented premises on or
before February 28, 1979. 14

Paragraph 4 of the Stipulation

7

Id. at 1 4 (R. 3 ) .

8

Id. at H

9

Id. at 1 11 & Exhibit B (R. 3-4 & 10).

5 & 6 (R. 3 ) .

10

R. 2-12.

11

Summons (R. 13-14).

12

R. 15-16.

13

Id.

14

R. 16,

for Settlement provided that, if ABE failed to make the
required payment to Intermountain by February 17, 1979, or if
ABE failed to vacate the premises on or before February 28,
1979, Intermountain could proceed on its Complaint.15
ABE failed to pay the remaining amounts due and failed
to

remove

February

itself
28,

Settlement.16

from the rented premises on or before

1979, breaching

the

Stipulation

for

ABE actually failed to remove itself from the

rented premises until May 15, 1979.17

One month later, on

June 14, 1979, counsel for Intermountain contacted counsel
for ABE, Mr. John T. Caine, and informed him of the breaches
of the Stipulation

for Settlement and of Intermountain's

intention to enter a default against ABE.

Despite this

notice, Intermountain received no response from ABE or Mr.
Caine.18
Consequently, on August 12, 1980, approximately fourteen
months after notifying ABE of its intention to take a default
15

Id.

16

Affidavit of Stephen G. Stoker dated July 10, 1980 f
4 (R. 20) ("Stoker Affidavit"); Affidavit of Randall S. Feil
dated August 29, 1986 J 7 (R. 48) ("Feil Affidavit").
17

Affidavit of Raymond Bowers dated July 16, 1980 % 3
(R. 18) ("Bowers Affidavit").
18

Stoker Affidavit 1 6 (R. 21); Feil Affidavit % 8 (R.
48) ; Contra, Affidavit of Attorney John T. Caine f 5 (R. 41)
("Caine Affidavit").
4

judgment
against

against
ABE. 1 9

it,

a

Default

Also, on August

Default was entered

Certificate

was

entered

12, 1980, a Judgment by

in favor of Intermountain and against

ABE, 2 0 giving ABE credit in the sum of $1,800.00 21 for the
four

rent

possession

checks
of

in

the

amount

Intermountain's

of

$450.00

counsel

Stipulation for Settlement was executed.22

at

each
the

in

the

time

the

On the same day,

August 12, 1980, a copy of the Judgment by Default was mailed
to ABE's counsel of record, Mr. Caine. 23
ABE filed its first Notice of Hearing stating that ABE
"will call on for hearing its Motion to Set Aside Judgment,
on the

28th

day

of August,

1980,

. . . "24

The Court,

however, struck the Motion because counsel did not appear. 25
ABE filed a second Notice of Hearing stating that ABE "will
call on for hearing its Motion to Set Aside Judgment on the
19

R. 17.

20

R. 23.

21

Bowers Affidavit f 5 (R. 19).

22

Stipulation for Settlement f 1(a) (R. 15).

23

R. 24; Mr. Caine in the Affidavit of Attorney John
T. Caine f 4 (R. 41) acknowledges receipt of the Judgment by
Default.
24

R. 22.

25

Minute Order dated August 28, 1986 (R. 26).

5

19th

day

Hearing,

of

September,

however,

approximately

one

was

1980." 26

not

month

filed

after

scheduled to take place. 27

This
until

the

second
October

date

the

Notice

of

17, 1980,

hearing

was

ABE, however, asserts that these

hearings were struck because ABE believed the matter had been
resolved and the Judgment by Default would be removed because
it

was

entered

scheduled,

in

error.2**

rescheduled,

and

After
struck,

these

hearings

however,

were

negotiations

between ABE and Intermountain continued until they reached an
impasse.
ABE also never filed the Motion to Set Aside Judgment
referred to in the Notices of Hearing and never filed any
affidavits in support of any such motion.

No Motion to Set

Aside Judgment or any affidavit in support of a Motion to Set
Aside Judgment

dated before

1985 or

filed before

1986 is

contained in the record on appeal. 29
26

Notice of Hearing (R. 27).

27

Id.

28

Caine Affidavit % 1 (R. 41).

29

In the record on appeal the Judgment by Default was
filed August 12, 1980 (R. 23), the Certificate of Mailing of
the Judgment by Default to counsel for ABE was attached to
the Judgment by Default (R. 24) , the Memorandum of Costs and
Disbursements was filed on August 12, 1980 (R. 25), a Minute
Order was filed on August 28, 1980 (R. 26), and the second
Notice of Hearing was filed on October 17, 1980 (R. 27); the
next document in the record on appeal is an Execution dated
March 8, 1985 (R. 28).
6

Intermountain agreed to modify the Judgment by Default
if Mr. Burke, the principal of ABE, signed a Promissory Note
capacity. 30

Mr. Burke, however, was not

willing to sign such a note.

Mr. Burke's refusal to sign the

in his personal

note was set forth in a letter dated December 5, 1980, from
Mr. Caine, counsel for ABE, to Mr. Randall S. Feil, counsel
for Intermountain.31

The full text of the December 5, 1980,

letter follows: 32
After our last telephone conversation, I spent some
time with my client, Mr. Burk [sic], to attempt to
get him to sign the Promissory Note. I am sorry to
report that because of the uncertainty of his
divorce, he is just simply not willing at this time
to commit himself to pay $200.00 per month because
he is not certain he can actually afford that. He
is already under a temporary court order to pay
$450.00 a month for three children and is in
contempt of court because he is delinquent.
In the divorce, his wife was also asking for
alimony payments of $200.00 a month plus additional
payments on debts.
If the judge does not afford
him some relief, there is no way he could pay these
amounts plus the $200.00 a month you want. He is
basically taking in $800.00 to $1,000.00 a month
income to himself.
The company is on the verge of bankruptcy. There
are no real assets that are free and clear.
The
building the office is in is rented and his
inventory is only large enough to fill on-going
accounts.
The company also has approximately
$35,000.00 in judgements against it, prior to
30

Feil Affidavit f 10 (R. 49).

31

Id. at f 11 & Exhibit C (R. 49 & 54).

32

Id. Exhibit C (R. 54).
7

yourself.
We have been attempting to work with
each creditor, as with you, to get the debts
squared away so that the business could continue to
operate.
If he could operate for a year without
further law suits or problems, he would probable
[sic] be able to pull the company out of its
financial problems.
I realize this doesn't help your client, but I know
of no other way to proceed.
As far as I am
concerned, we could do one of two things; your
client could either wait a little longer to see how
we come out on the divorce, or we will just have to
go back into court and argue my Motion to Set Aside
the Judgement.
If you have any other suggestions, I would be open
to them. I appreciate your cooperation.
Consequently,
because

Mr.

the

Judgment

by

Default

was

Burke, ABE's principal, refused

never

modified

to execute a

promissory note. 3 3
Sometime

before

March

8,

1985, Intermountain

located

some property owned by ABE and attempted to execute upon the
Judgment

by

Default.

The

Clerk

of

the

Third

Judicial

District Court of Salt Lake County issued an Execution dated
March

8,

Precipe 35

1985, 3 4
directing

and
the

counsel

for

Sheriff

to

Intermountain

filed

execute

property

upon

a

owned by ABE and located at 4611 Namba Way, Murray, Utah.
Following the directions contained in the Precipe, the Salt
33

Id. at % 11 (R. 49) .

34

R. 28-29.

35

R. 30-31.
8

Lake

County

Sheriff

noticed

the

sale

of

property for April 9, 1985, at 12:00 p.m.

the

Namba

(noon). 36

Way
This

Sheriff's Sale, however, was cancelled due to ABE's filing of
bankruptcy.37
It was not until January 10, 1986, that ABE filed its
first Motion to Set Aside Judgment. 38

While the Motion to

Set Aside Judgment is dated December 31, 1985, it was not
filed until January
stamp. 39
Motion.
Aside

10, 1986, as indicated by the clerk's

No hearing, however, was ever scheduled on this
On July 25, 1986, ABE filed a second Motion to Set

Judgment

and

scheduling a hearing

Hearing

Thereon

dated

May

for August 1, 1986. 40

25,

1986

Although this

second Motion to Set Judgment and Hearing Thereon is dated
May 25, 1986, it was not filed with the Salt Lake County
Clerk's

Office

until

two

months

later. 41

Also,

in

conjunction with this second Motion to Set Aside, ABE filed
the Affidavit of Attorney John T. Caine dated May 15, 1986,
36

Proof of Publication (R. 34).

37

Real Estate-Execution Cancelled (R. 35).

38

R. 36-37.

3

Id.

^

40

R. 38-39.

41

Id; this document scheduled a hearing on August 1,
1986, at 10:00 a.m.
9

and filed on July 25, 1986. 42
The second Motion to Set Aside originally scheduled for
hearing

on

August

1,

1986,

before

the

Honorable

Scott

Daniels, was continued until August 15, 1986, at 10:00 a.m.43
The August 15, 1986, hearing was rescheduled to August 29,
1986. 44 In opposition to ABE's Motion to Set Aside Judgment,
Intermountain filed the Affidavit of Randall S. Feil, one of
the attorneys who was representing Intermountain at the time
the Judgment

by

Default was

entered. 45

Counsel

for

ABE

failed to attend the hearing scheduled on August 29, 1986,
and the District Court ordered that the Motion to Set Aside
be

denied. 46

At

ABE's

counsel's

request

hearing was held on December 19, 1986.
the

oral

argument

of

counsel

and

an

additional

The Court entertained

once

again

denied

the

Motions to Set Aside.

42

R. 40-42.

43

Order dated August 1, 1986.

44
44-45).

Amended Notice of Hearing dated August 14, 1986 (R.

45

R. 47-54.

46

Minute Order dated August 29, 1986 (R. 46).

10

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
No Motion to Set Aside was filed in this case until
January 10, 1986, over five years after the Judgment by
Default had been entered.

Consequently, under Utah R. Civ.

P. 60(b)(1), the trial court had no choice other than to deny
the Motion.
Further, even if the Motion to Set Aside Judgment had
been filed in a timely manner, the District Court did not
clearly abuse its discretion in refusing to set aside the
Judgment by Default, entered in excess of six years prior to
the

date

of

the hearing

on ABE's Motion

to Set Aside

Judgment.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT DOES NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO
SET ASIDE A JUDGMENT DATED AUGUST 12,
1980, WHEN THE MOTION TO SET ASIDE
JUDGMENT IS FILED ON JANUARY 10, 1986,
OVER FIVE YEARS LATER.
A

motion

for

relief

filed

under

the

first

four

subsections of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) must be
filed within three months from the date the Judgment is
entered.

Neither

Motion

to

Set

Aside

specifies

the

subsection in Rule 60(b) under which it is being filed,
although

ABE

argues

on

appeal

11

that

it was

filed under

subsection ( l ) , 4 7 and under subsection ( 7 ) . 4 8
the requested relief —

inadvertence and excusable neglect—

fall within Rule 60(b)(1).
as

grounds

for

its

ABE even argues that subsection

requested

Consequently,

because

encompassed

subsection

in

The basis for

relief

ABE's
(1)

on

grounds
of

Rule

this

for
60(b),

appeal, 49

relief
ABE

are

cannot

escape the three-month limitation by resorting the "catchall" subsection (7) of Rule 60(b). 5 0
In this case, the Judgment by Default was entered on
August

12,

1980,

and

the

Certificate

of

Mailing

on

the

Judgment by Default indicates that it was mailed to counsel
for ABE on the same date.

Consequently, within three months

from the entry of the judgment, ABE was under an obligation
to file a motion for relief under Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b).
ABE did
first

dated

file two Motions to Set Aside Judgment, the
December

31, 1985, and

filed

on January

10,

1986, 5 1 and the second dated May 25, 1986, and filed on July
47

Brief of Appellant at 5.

48

Id. at 8.

49

Id. at 5.

50

In re Estate of Chasel, 725 P.2d 1345, 1349 (Utah
1986); In re Estate of Pepper, 711 P.2d 261, 263 (Utah 1985);
Larsen v. Collina. 684 P.2d 52, 54 (Utah 1984); Russell v.
Martell, 681 P.2d 1193, 1195 (Utah 1984).
51

R. 36-37.
12

25, 1986. 52

The first Motion, therefore, was filed over five

years after the Judgment was entered.
filed

almost

six

years

after

the

The second Motion was
Judgment

was

entered.

Neither of these Motions, therefore, were filed in a timely
manner. 53
ABE also asserts that two Motions to Set Aside were
filed. 54

ABE, however, suggests that the first Motion was

filed before 1986 or in a timely manner, but was stricken
from the calendar due to discussions that the judgment would
be set aside because it was in error. 55

ABE did file two

Notices of Hearing on a Motion to Set Aside Judgment, the
first setting

a hearing

stricken

to

Notice

due
of

for August

counsel's

Hearing

was

28, 1980, 56 which was

non-appearance.57
filed

on

October

The

second

17,

1980,

approximately one month after the hearing it scheduled for
September 19, 1980. 58
52

The record on appeal, however, does

R. 38-39.

53

E.g. , In re Estate of Chasel, 725 P.2d 1345, 1349
(Utah 1986).
54

Brief of Appellant at 3-4.

55

Id. at 3.

56

R. 22.

57

Minute Order dated August 28, 1980 (R. 26).

58

R. 27.
13

not contain any Motion to Set Aside filed in a timely manner•
ABE

is

correct

in

its

assertion

that

two

separate

motions were filed, but the record demonstrates that neither
motion was filed in a timely manner.

Accordingly, pursuant

to the terms of Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) and its mandate that
any motion to set aside must be filed within three months
after the entry of the judgment, the District Court properly
denied ABE's untimely Motions to Set Aside.
POINT II
EVEN IF THE RECORD REFLECTED THAT A
MOTION TO SET ASIDE HAD BEEN FILED IN A
TIMELY MANNER, THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT
ABUSE ITS CONSIDERABLE DISCRETION IN
REFUSING TO SET ASIDE A JUDGMENT ENTERED
IN AUGUST OF 1980 WHEN THAT REQUEST WAS
ARGUED TO THE COURT FOR THE FIRST TIME IN
DECEMBER OF 1986
The

District

Court

in

this

case

has

considerable

discretion in determining whether to grant relief under Utah
R. Civ. P. 60(b).

That discretionary decision will not be

reversed on appeal unless the appellant clearly demonstrates
an abuse of that considerable discretion, which places a very
heavy burden upon the appellant.^9

That some basis may exist

to set aside the Judgment by Default does not require the
conclusion that the District Court abused its discretion in

59

Katz v. Pierce. 723 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1986);
Larsen v. Collina. 684 P.2d 52, 54 (Utah 1984); Pitman v.
Bonham, 677 P.2d 1126, 1127 (Utah 1984).
14

refusing to do so when the facts and circumstances support
the refusal. 60
While

the

record

reflects, as ABE

asserts, that two

Motions to Set Aside were filed, both of these Motions were
filed in 1986, over five years after the judgment had been
entered.
District

Even
Court

if
did

a

timely

not

Motion

clearly

had

abuse

been

its

filed,

the

discretion

in

refusing to set aside the Judgment by Default entered on
August 12, 1980, when the oral argument was scheduled over
six years later on December 19, 1986.

Failing to notice up

the Motion for an extended period of time, such as over six
years, caused evidence to become stale.

It is an appropriate

exercise of the District Court's broad discretion

in this

matter to deny such a motion.
Based upon the record in this case, even if a Motion had
been filed in a timely manner and if that Motion had been
argued in a timely manner, neither of which occurred in this
case, the District Court did not clearly abuse its discretion
in refusing to set aside the Judgment by Default.
however,

it

is

inappropriate

to

examine

Normally,

the merits

default judgment on appeal. 61

Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1986).
Larsen v. Collina, 684 P.2d 52, 55 (Utah 1984).
15

of a

A»

ABE Did Not Comply With the Terms of the Stipulation for
Settlement
The Lease Agreement under which Intermountain leased the

property to ABE expired according to its own terms on January
31, 1978.62

ABE, however, continued to possess the property

after the expiration of the Lease Agreement as a month-tomonth tenant.

ABE was served with a Fifteen-Day Notice to

Quit on October 13, 1978.63

ABE, however, continued to

occupy the premises until May 15, 1979.64

On November 3,

1978, ABE was served with a Summons and Complaint.65
Stipulation

for

Settlement was entered

into between

A
the

parties requiring ABE to pay $2,899.42 on or before February
17,

1979, and

requiring

ABE

to

remove

itself

premises on or before February 28, 1979.66

from the

ABE, however,

failed to discharge either of these obligations.
There was no credible evidence before the District Court
to support ABE's allegation that it "complied with the terms
of

the

Settlement

[Intermountain]

had

Agreement
no

right

and
to

that

enforce

plaintiff
the

default

62

Lease Agreement f 1 (R. 6).

63

Fifteen-Day Notice to Quit (R. 10).

64

Bowers Affidavit f 3 (R. 18).

65

R. 13-14.

66

Stipulation for Settlement ff 1 & 2 (R. 15-16).
16

provisions against

[ABE] . . . . " b /

ABE was under an

obligation to pay Intermountain the sum of $2,899.42 on or
before February 17, 1979.

Intermountain's counsel held four

checks in the amount of $450.00 each for a total of $1,800.00
to be applied to that sum, leaving a balance of $1,099.42.
ABE makes the undocumented assertion that it paid all the
monies that were due pursuant to the terms of the Stipulation
for Settlement.68
ABE also suggests (six years after the events occurred)
that it removed itself from the premises in a timely fashion
pursuant to the terms of the Stipulation for Settlement.69
This

bare

assertion

is

unsupported

by

any

documentary

evidence.
The more credible evidence in the record on appeal,
however,

is

to

the

contrary.

Two

affidavits

filed

contemporaneously with the taking of the Judgment by Default
establish that Intermountain had received only the $1,800.00
already in its counsel's possession and that ABE had failed
to

pay

the

remaining

amounts

due

67

Brief of Appellant at 7.

68

Caine Affidavit if 4 (R. 41) .

69

and

owing

under

Id.
Noticeably absent from the record
affidavit by Mr. Burke, ABE's principal.
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the

is any

Stipulation for Settlement.70

Further, the record reflects

that ABE failed to remove itself from the premises until May
15, 1979, approximately two and one-half months after the
time the Stipulation for Settlement required ABE to remove
itself

from the premises.71

Further, ABE's counsel was

notified of the breach of the Stipulation for Settlement,
requested to file an Answer, and when no response was filed,
the Judgment by Default was taken in favor of Intermountain
and against ABE. 72

Consequently, there was ample evidence,

which is more credible than ABE's evidence because it was
more contemporary with the occurrence of the events, from
which the District Court could conclude that ABE had no
defense to the taking of the Default Judgment.
District Court could properly
extensive

delay

and

the

Further, the

conclude that, due to the

staleness

of

the

evidence,

Intermountain had been improperly prejudiced by ABE's delay.

/u

Bowers Affidavit 1 5 (R. 19); Stoker Affidavit J 4
(R. 20); Mr. Bowers was one of the partners in Intermountain
and filed this Affidavit almost contemporaneously with the
time the events were occurring; Mr. Stoker was
Intermountain's counsel of record at the time and also filed
his Affidavit almost contemporaneously with the occurrence of
the events; Mr. Caine's Affidavit, on the other hand, was
filed over six years after the events occurred.
71

Bowers Affidavit f 3 (R. 18) ; Stoker Affidavit f 4

(R. 20).
72

Stoker Affidavit 1 6 (R. 21) .
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B.

ABE Was Aware That the Judgment by Default Had Been
Entered
On June 14, 1979, Intermountain's counsel notified ABE's

counsel

of

Intermountain's

Judgment against ABE,

intention

to

take

a

Default

While it is true that a Default

Judgment was not entered until over a year later on August
12, 1980, a copy of the Judgment by Default was mailed to
ABE's

counsel.

Further,

six days

later, ABE's counsel

prepared a Notice of Hearing dated August 18, 1980, and filed
it with the Court on August 20, 1980, scheduling a hearing on
a Motion to Set Aside Judgment, which was never filed, on
August 28, 1980.73

Consequently, ABE was aware of the fact

that a Judgment by Default had been entered against it, but
failed to file a motion or appear at the hearing scheduled on
August 28, 1980.74
C.

ABE Knew That Intermountain Refused to Modify or Set
Aside the Judgment by Default
ABE suggests that, after discussing the matter with

Intermountain's counsel, the Motion to Set Aside was stricken
from the calendar because an agreement had been reached that
the judgment would be removed because it was in error.75
Negotiations

continued

between

the

parties

in

73

Notice of Hearing (R. 22).

74

Minute Order dated August 28, 1980 (R. 26).

75

Caine Affidavit % 7 (R. 43).
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which

Intermountain

agreed

to

modify

the

entered

Judgment

by

Default in the event that ABE's principal, Mr, Burke, would
execute a promissory note personally obligating Mr. Burke for
ABE's debt to Intermountain.
letter dated

December

As reflected in ABE's counsel's

5, 1980,76

Mr. Burke refused to

personally obligate himself for the debt.

As of that date,

therefore, ABE was aware that Intermountain did not intend to
set aside the Judgment by Default unless Mr. Burke would
agree to personally obligate himself on a promissory note.
ABE

also was

aware that Mr. Burke had

Intermountain's

demand

in

that

regard,

refused to meet
and

therefore,

Intermountain had no intention of modifying or setting aside
the Judgment by Default.

Consistent with this understanding,

ABE's counsel suggested in its December 5, 1980, letter, that
they had a choice:

either wait to determine the outcome of

Mr. Burke's divorce proceedings or go back into court and
argue a Motion to Set Aside Judgment.

Apparently, ABE chose

to wait, rather than present a Motion to the Court and argue
it.

In fact, ABE waited for a period exceeding six-years to

file and argue that motion.77
76

Affidavit of Randall S. Feil, Exhibit C (R. 54).

77

The assertion in Caine Affidavit f 7 (R. 40-42) is
that Mr. Caine believed that after speaking with
Intermountain's counsel that the matter had been resolved and
the Judgment would be removed as it was in error.
This
assertion, however, is directly controverted by the December
20

D.

ABE Offers No Excuse for the Final Twenty-Month Delay
Finally, even if ABE was justified in its initial delay

in

this

case,

by

April

of

1985, ABE

was

aware

that

Intennountain was attempting to execute upon its property by
virtue of the Judgment by Default,
sometime

prior

to

April

8,

ABE filed for bankruptcy
1985,

cancellation of the Sheriff's Sale,78
attempting
December

to
19,

argue

any

1986, over

Motion
one

which

the

ABE took no action in

before

and

caused

the

one-half

Court
years

until
later.

Consequently, even if ABE had a justifiable excuse for the
initial four and one-half year delay, it was responsible for
an additional delay of over twenty months.

Based upon this

second delay, for which ABE has no excuse, together with the
attendant prejudice to Intennountain, the Court would be
justified in exercising its discretion in favor of denying
ABE's Motion to Set Aside Judgment.

5, 1980, letter (R. 54), which Mr. Caine drafted and signed.
This letter "recognized at that time Intermountain had no
intention of modifying its Judgment by Default unless Mr.
Burke became personally obligated on the debt, something Mr.
Burke refused to do.
Consequently, the statement in the
Brief of Appellant at 6 that Intermountain recognized that
the Judgment by Default was improper and would take no action
to enforce it was refuted.
The more credible evidence is
that ABE's counsel knew that, due to Mr. Burke's refusal to
become personally obligated in the debt, Intermountain had no
intention of modifying the Judgment by Default.
78

R. 35.
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CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm the District Court's refusal to
set

aside

the Judgment

Intermountain

and

by

Default

against ABE.

entered

in

favor of

First, Utah Rule Civil

Procedure 60(b)(1) requires a Motion to Set Aside a Judgment
to

be

filed

entered.

within

three months

after the Judgment

is

Despite the fact that ABE was aware that a Judgment

by Default had been entered on August 12, 1980, it failed to
file any Motion to Set Aside the Judgment until January 10,
1986, over five years later.
Second, even if the motion had been filed in a timely
manner, no oral argument was held in this case until after
the lapse of six years following the entry of the Judgment by
Default.

This created problems concerning the staleness of

evidence

and

Intermountain's

itself against the motion.

ability

to

properly

defend

On that basis alone —

the

failure to notice up the motion for hearing for such an
extended period of time —

the District Court was justified

in exercising its considerable discretion in favor of denying
ABE's request for relief.
Third, even if a Motion had been filed in a timely
manner and if it had been argued in a timely manner, the
District

Court

was

justified

in

exercising

its

ample

discretion in refusing to grant ABE's request for relief.
22

The most credible evidence in the record indicates that ABE
had no defense to the entry of this judgment against it.

It

breached the Stipulation for Settlement by failing to pay the
amounts due and by failing to vacate itself from the premises
before the agreed upon date.

Intermountain notified opposing

counsel of its intent to take a default judgment.
opposing

counsel's

Based upon

failure to respond, the Judgment was

entered due to ABE's multiple breaches of the Stipulation for
Settlement.
Finally, ABE was aware of the entry of the Judgment by
Default and entered into negotiations with Intermountain to
resolve it.

These negotiations, disintegrated because ABE's

principal, Richard C. Burke, refused to execute a promissory
note.

Knowing that the judgment was entered and that it

could not be resolved through negotiations, however, ABE
failed to take the necessary steps to have it set aside, if
it had any basis to do so.

Accordingly, even if ABE filed a

timely Motion and if it argued it in a timely manner, the
Court was justified in exercising its discretion in refusing
to set the judgment aside.
The Order of the District Court should be affirmed, with
costs awarded to Intermountain.
Rule

of Appellate

Procedure

Further, pursuant to Utah

33, because this appeal

is

frivolous, attorneys' fees and double costs should be awarded
23

to Intermountain in the form of a judgment against ABE and
its attorney.
Dated:

November hQ , 1987.
DART, ADAMSON & KASTING

lark CAT. I(arsj
Attorneys^-ftSr
Plaintiff/Respondent
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John T. Caine
Richard, Caine & Allen
2568 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, Utah 844 01
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